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Abstract 
 
Stock markets have been rapidly developed around the world during the last 20 years. Accordingly, there is 
sincere academic interest in understanding the determinants of this phenomenon. Most studies advocate that the 
development of a stock market is influenced by a few individual country variables such as the origin of its legal 
system, enforcement of law, accounting patterns, transparency, corporate ownership structure, and the level of 
creditor  and  minority  investor  protection.  This  paper  extends  previous  empirical  literature  concerning  the 
determinants of stock market development. We built a unique sample of 50 countries, ranging from those with 
emerging to developed economies. From a set of 60 potential variables, 12 factors were employed using multiple 
regression. The research breaks new ground by using different constructs taken from financial literature, such as 
the Human Development Index (HDI, 2010), Managerial Skills of Entrepreneurs and Democracy of the Country. 
Results showed that more factors may influence the development of stock markets, such as the adaptability of 
firms and the openness of a country, helping avoid the multicollinearity effects that may have affected earlier 
studies. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Stock  markets  around the  world  have  been  developed  vigorously  during  the past  20  years. 
Several  benefits  can  be  attributed  to  the  development  of  the  stock  markets,  such  as  economic 
development and allocation of resources for productive opportunities (Camargos & Barbosa, 2006). In 
general,  there  is  a  strong  correlation  between  economic  development  and  stock  market  activity, 
because  stock  markets  allow  people,  firms  and  institutions  to  invest  their  savings  in  productive 
activities.  According  to  the  World  Bank  (2010),  several  contributions  can  be  associated  with 
developed stock markets: 
⋅  Investment in stocks is a form of long-term saving that is invested directly in production activity.  
⋅  Developed markets reward investors by returns maximization and the efficient use of resources, 
which are the seeds to begin a cycle of development and competitiveness.  
⋅  Developed markets with liquidity, volume and regulation stimulate businesses at a firm-level. 
⋅  Shareholder activity reflects the expectations of the main market players, as well as their opinions 
about both domestic and international states of economic affairs.  
⋅  Finally, an efficient stock market has a fundamental role in attracting, maximizing, consolidating 
and retaining external capital. 
According to the World Bank (2010) and International Monetary Fund (2010), the Brazilian 
stock market had an increase in its capitalization from 28% of the GDP in 1996 to 67% in 2006. 
Despite  this  growth,  the  Brazilian  market  is  still  proportionately  small  when  compared  to  other 
countries such as Chile (120%), Australia (140%), U.S.A. (148%) or Hong Kong (904%).  
Another interesting aspect of the Brazilian stock market is the significant increase in the number 
of investors willing to transfer part of their savings from fixed income to stocks and mutual funds. 
According to Info Money (2010), the number of individual investors in the Brazilian stock market 
increased from 85,249 in 2002 to 558,853 in February 2010, representing a555% growth during that 
period. 
Many countries have tried to stimulate the development and investment level of their stock 
markets as a mean to achieve economic growth and social welfare. Some authors have studied this 
connection through issues involving corporate governance, pointing out the advantages that firms and 
markets gained from the adoption of such practices. According to Rogers, Ribeiro and Souza (2005), 
the development of the stock market depends on the good practices of corporate governance, because 
the adoption of an efficient system of corporate governance increases liquidity, negotiation volume 
and share valuation, consequently reducing the exposure of the firms to macroeconomic factors.  
Still in the lines of Corporate Governance, we can highlight some studies that tried to identify 
the characteristics of countries with well-developed stock markets: Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La 
Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishiny, 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004. They studied a wide 
range  of  factors  that  could  affect  corporate  governance,  from  firm  and  country  characteristics  to 
political and legal structure. 
Taking these studies into consideration, the objective of the present paper is to evaluate, under a 
broader approach, the determinants of the development of stock markets around the world. Instead of 
evaluating the benefits of having a developed stock market based upon a set of country characteristics 
(as in Dyck & Zingales, 2004) or the benefits of investor protection and corporate governance (La 
Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishiny, 2000), this paper analyzes a new set of relevant factors 
for  stock  market  growth,  which  have  not  yet  been  analyzed  in  financial  literature.  The  main 
distinctions from the existing literature are the inclusion of the Human Development Index (HDI, 
2010), the Entrepreneurial Ability of Managers, and the Democratic Political Structure of the sampled C. A. B. Forti, C. Yen-Tsang, F. M. Peixoto                    354 
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countries. The improvement upon existing literature is not limited to selection of the variables, but 
also extends to how these variables have been treated and argued. We believe that there could be 
factors that simultaneously influence several of the variables analyzed in the previous literature. If this 
assumption is true, previous analysis could have been done under a multicollinearity effect, which 
could invalidate previously proposed models.  
In this paper, we initially employed variable reduction through factor analysis. In addition, we 
ran multiple regression techniques using the previously obtained factors instead of each individual 
original variable. 
The  paper  is  organized as  follows.  Firstly,  we  present the  existing  literature.  Secondly,  we 
describe the methodology and data employed in this research. Then, the empirical test results are 
presented. After that, we discuss the results of the tests and finally we have the conclusion of the paper. 
 
 
Theory 
 
 
Recent studies concerning the development of stock markets (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; La Porta 
et al., 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) cover a broad range of aspects, namely: (a) origin of legal 
system and enforcement levels; (b) level of protection for minority shareholders and creditors; (c) 
ownership structure and corporate control; (d) transparency and accounting standards; and (e) volume 
of IPOs (Initial Public Offerings) and incentives for IPOs. 
At the same time, Zingales (1995), Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998), and Brau and Fawcett 
(2006) pointed out other factors that affect the level of stock market development. These include: (a) 
concentration  of  corporate  ownership,  private  benefits  of  control  and  expropriation  of  minority 
shareholders, (b) resistance of firms to an IPO, (c) informational asymmetries and errors in share 
pricing, (d) conflicts and agency costs, and (e) unfavorable economic conditions. All these factors are 
interrelated and characterize the legal and institutional environment of each country under analysis. 
This paper aims to disentangle these relations by analyzing key aspects separately, while showing their 
interrelations. 
 
Investor protection, legal origin and enforcement 
 
Several elements of a country’s financial system such as breadth and depth of their stock market, 
the  pace  of  new  bond  issues,  the  patterns  of  corporate  ownership  structures  and  efficiency  of 
investment allocation appear to be explained, conceptually and empirically, by how well (or at what 
level) the rule of law protects outside investors (La Porta et al., 2000). 
La  Porta  et  al.  (2000)  argue  that  shareholder  and  creditors’  legal  protection  is  central  to 
understanding the models of corporate finance in different countries. 
Thus, changes in the legal system and its enforcement are central to understand why some firms 
raise more funds than others across countries. La Porta et al. (2000) stated that when investor rights 
(i.e., voting rights) and creditor rights (i.e., reorganization and liquidation rights) are well protected 
and enforced by legislation and courts, they are more willing to finance firms. In such a situation, 
insiders are required to reduce expropriation, if any exists, and, as a consequence, the private benefits 
of control are diminished. 
Following this line of studies, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) discussed 
a set of legal rules that protect shareholders and creditors in 49 countries worldwide. They created an 
index of anti-director  rights to measure the rights of shareholders and a score for the rights of 
creditors for each country analyzed, according to their legal origin. Stock Market Development: an Analysis                                 355 
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David and Brierly (1985) discussed that the legal systems of most countries derive from a few 
legal families, primarily common law (English) or civil law (French or German). They proposed that 
the legal origin determines the degree to which outsiders are protected and show that common law 
countries have stronger outsider investor protection than French civil law countries. In addition, they 
report that in countries with French civil law, such protection is weaker than in countries with German 
civil law or Scandinavian countries. 
As shown in La Porta et al. (2000), the strong investor protection is associated with effective 
corporate governance, reflected in broader and more highly valued financial markets, dispersed share 
ownership  and  efficient  allocation  of  resources  among  firms.  They  cited  several  attempts  at 
governance reform in countries like Germany, the USA and Poland. Despite the hurdles involved in 
this process, they argued that the reform of investor protection is politically feasible and can bring 
significant economic benefits. 
 
Corporate ownership structure and control  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that the structure of ownership and control and the level of 
legal protection for investors vary greatly between countries. The United States, Germany, Britain and 
Japan are examples of countries where the governance systems are effective, the ownership structures 
are dispersed and levels of minority shareholder protection are high. On the other hand, countries that 
fail to develop good governance mechanisms are characterized by a low level of legal protection and 
high ownership concentration (Italy, Latin America, Russia and India). 
As an example, in Italy, Pagano et al. (1998) claimed that the stock market is underdeveloped 
due to the following major problems: ownership concentration, lack of effective legal enforcement, 
greater potential for agency conflicts and large expropriation of minority investors. According to the 
authors, in Italy, tax evasion is a common practice, and firms often keep two parallel accounting 
controls, indicating a low level of transparency. 
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) conducted a study on the ownership structure of 
large corporations in 27 developed countries. In contrast to the Berle and Means’ (1932) modern 
corporation, they find that few firms have dispersed ownership. In addition they show that the primary 
agency conflict observed in most countries is of the majority-minority shareholder type, unlike what 
happens in the United States, where the conflict of interest between management and shareholders 
prevails. According to La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) and Bozec and 
Bozec (2007), pyramidal structures and the existence of multiple classes of shares are two ways to 
separate cash flow rights from control in firms, and increase the use of private benefits of control. 
In the Brazilian context, for instance, Leal, Carvalhal-da-Silva and Valadares (2002), showed 
that there is a high amount of shareholders with voting rights and, therefore, the one share-one vote 
rule does not apply. In 1998, from the 225 firms analyzed in this study, 155 (69%) had a single 
shareholder who owned more than 50% of the voting rights. 
Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) showed that in firms which do not 
operate under one share-one vote, there is a tendency to have higher private benefits of control, which 
occurs mainly when these firms are located in countries with weak enforcement. 
Another study that explored the private benefits of control is Doidge, Karolyi, Stulz, Lins and 
Miller (2005). They investigated these benefits and their relation to the ownership structure and the 
decision to issue shares in foreign markets (i.e., American Depositary Receipts, ADRs) in about 4,000 
firms from 31 countries in Asia, Europe and Latin America. They argued that if the main shareholder 
owns only ordinary shares, he will want to extract the maximum benefits of control. On the other hand, 
if he also holds a reasonable amount of preferred shares (i.e., without voting rights), he is willing to 
extract private benefits of control, which will reduce the value of the firm and also its own capital. C. A. B. Forti, C. Yen-Tsang, F. M. Peixoto                    356 
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In a related study, Dyck and Zingales (2004) measured private benefits of control (PBC) in 39 
countries using 393 blocks of ownership stock sales during the period of 1990-2000. They realized 
that, on average, corporate control relates to 14% of the equity value of the firm, ranging from -4% in 
Japan to 65% in Brazil. This result is consistent with what was already shown by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997). 
To do so, Dyck and Zingales (2004) used 29 large and distinct firm and country characteristics 
including the premium price for a controlling block, market capitalization relative to GDP of the 
country,  concentration  of  ownership,  initial  public  offerings,  number  of  listed  firms,  takeover 
regulation, accounting standards, anti-director rights, the quality of the rule of law, the stock market 
rules, newspaper circulation, the level of tax compliance, and legal origin. As main results, Dyck and 
Zingales  (2004)  found  that  higher  PBCs  are  associated  with  less  developed  stock  markets,  more 
concentrated ownership, and more privatizations negotiated by the private sector. They also found that 
many institutional variables, taken separately, are shown to be associated with a lower level of PBCs: 
better  accounting  standards,  better  legal  protection  of  minority  shareholders,  intense  market 
competition, high level of press diffusion and high tax compliance. 
 
Disclosure 
 
According to Wong (2009), transparency (measured by the level of information disclosed) is 
one of the most common governance mechanisms used by firms, as well being the fundamental pillar 
to the development of stock markets. He notes that well-governed organizations increase transparency 
in order to give access to the same information to both insider and outsider shareholders, reducing the 
potential for insider expropriation. He also emphasizes that transparency is at the top of concerns 
about investment decisions for institutional investors.  
In line with these findings Malacrida and Yamamoto (2006) assessed the relationship between 
the level of disclosure of accounting data and the volatility of stock returns for 42 firms belonging to 
the BOVESPA in 2002. They found that a higher disclosure level implies on lower average volatility 
of  stock  returns  for  the  sample.  In  a  separate  stream,  Fernandes  and  Ferreira  (2007)  argued  that 
investment opportunities, external funding dependence, dispersion of ownership, cash holdings, an 
environment of strong legal protections for investors and greater visibility and access to global stock 
markets tend to increase transparency of organizations and reduce earnings management. 
For the Brazilian context, Lopes and Walker (2008) found that stricter governance choices and 
the decision to issue ADRs (American Depositary Receipts) are negatively related to the manipulation 
of financial reporting in firms inserted in the same institutional environment. In a similar stream, 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) concluded that firms that issue ADRs reduce the variation in the returns 
of their stock and that the information about the firms is quickly incorporated into stock prices. 
Dalmácio (2009) assessed the relationship between good corporate governance practices and 
accuracy of forecasts of analysts of the Brazilian market from the perspective of the Signaling Theory. 
He concluded that analysts seem to be incorporating the signal (governance) issued by firms, leading 
to a more accurate profit forecast. 
Silveira and Dias (2007) investigated the impact of disclosure disputes between controlling and 
minority  shareholders  on  the  share  price  in  the  Brazilian  stock  market.  They  found  a  significant 
negative abnormal return of shares (7%) shortly after the publication of gathered news. 
 
Volume of IPOs (Initial Public Offerings) and incentives for IPO 
 
La  Porta,  Lopez-De-Silanes,  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1997)  reported  wide  differences  in  the 
activity  of  IPOs  across  countries.  The  volume  of  IPOs  is  one  of  the  factors  that  signals  the 
development of the capital market of a country (Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998). Stock Market Development: an Analysis                                 357 
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Evidence of large variations in the number of IPOs across countries and over time suggests that 
the market conditions represent the most important factor in the decision to go public. The firm’s life 
cycle stage is shown as the second most important factor (Ritter & Welch, 2002). 
By the early ‘80s, the decision to go public was a natural step for a firm to grow. However, in 
the ‘80s and ‘90s, some firms that went public started to become private again (Zingales, 1995). 
Pagano,  Panetta  and  Zingales  (1994)  found  that,  three  years  after  an  IPO,  there  is  a  high 
increase in the turnover in firm control. According to Zingales (1995), this suggests that the decision 
to go public should possibly be seen as an ideal method for selling a firm. Following this argument, 
Zingales (1995) claim that, by doing an IPO, the owner can change the balance between cash flow 
rights and control  rights  of  the  firm.  Thus, the  owner  would  use the  IPO  to optimize  ownership 
structure, in order to maximize their total earnings in a future transaction. 
In this model, the decision to go public is entirely directed by the willingness to maximize the 
owner’s surplus. This can lead to a dispute between the ideal private situation and the ideal social 
situation.  
Under a similar point of view, Pagano et al. (1998) analyzed the reasons of leading Italian 
private firms to go public. Using a panel of 2,181 firms from the period 1982-1992 they presented the 
costs and benefits of joint stock. The concerns are: costs arising from adverse selection, information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, dubious pricing and moral hazard, fixed costs, loss of 
confidentiality of the firm's data. As benefits, they mentioned that an IPO helps in: overcoming the 
funding  constraints,  diversification,  increased  liquidity,  better  monitoring  by  the  stock  market, 
increasing the number of potential investors, increasing bargaining power with banks, transferring 
control, and adjusting stock pricing. 
Pagano et al. (1998) also found that in Italy and Europe as a whole, firms do not go public in 
order to finance subsequent investments and growth. Instead, they do so in order to re-balance their 
accounts after a period of high investment and growth. Finally, they verify that the probability of an 
IPO in Italy increases with firm size and the industry’s market-to-book ratio. 
According to Ritter and Welch (2002), the amount of firms going public in the U.S. from 1980 
to 2001 surpassed one per business day. The number of initial public offerings (IPOs), however, has 
varied from year to year, with some years seeing fewer than 100 IPOs, and others seeing more than 
400. These IPOs raised $488 billion (in 2001 dollars) in gross incomes, an average of $78 million per 
deal. The long-run performance of IPOs varies over time. 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) conducted a survey in 2000-2002, with 336 chief financial officers 
(CFOs), comparing theory with practice on the subject of initial public offering (IPO). They found that 
the main motivations for a firm to conduct an IPO involve the creation of shares for use in future 
acquisitions and the definition of market price or value of the firm concerned. 
At the same time, Brau and Fawcett (2006) argued that 63% of the sample used in their study 
involved firms that chose not to go public in this period. They said that among the reasons to remain 
private  are:  maintaining  control  in  decision-making,  avoiding  dilution  of  ownership,  and  poor 
conditions of industrial levels and the market. 
 
 
Hypotheses, Data and Empirical Methods  
 
 
Using different methods than previous studies, the approach in this study starts by seeking 
factors or constructs of each country that could be capable of explaining, in cross section and in a 
systematical way, the reasons for a healthy development of stock markets. Then, with similar database 
sources to the previously cited studies, such as World Development Indicator, The Economist, United C. A. B. Forti, C. Yen-Tsang, F. M. 
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⋅  Democracy  Factor:  Extracted from  the  yearbook  edition  of the  magazine  The  Economist. The 
database  provides the  classification  of  the  countries  according  to  their  political  situation. This 
database  provides  information  on  169  countries,  of  which  105  can  also  found  in  the  World 
Development Indicator database. 
According to The Economist, the countries can be classified based on their grades such as (a) 
Completely democratic; (b) Democratic; (c) Hybrid system; (d) Authoritarian. This distribution is 
demonstrated in the Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Countries and their Political Situation. 
Source: Adapted from the yearbook edition of the magazine The Economist. (2007). Yearbook. Retrieved April 6, 2010, from 
http://www.economist.com/node/8908438, referring to year 2006. 
This construct is composed of 5 dimensions (Electoral Process and Pluralism, Functioning of 
Government, Political Participation, Political Culture, and Civil Liberties). The construction of this 
variable,  as  well as its  items  and  scale, is  defined by  the  yearbook  edition  of  the  magazine  The 
Economist. The score of the variable Democracy is built on the arithmetic mean of the 5 dimensions 
according to magazine. The scale goes from 0 to 10. 
⋅  Human Development Factor: We use the Index of HDI (2010) obtained from the United Nation 
(UN) database referring to year 2006. This search resulted in a sample of HDI from 182 countries. 
Despite the limitation of the definition, this variable was chosen as a proxy of the social-human 
situation, since it is the only one available with information published by a relevant international 
agency (UN). 
⋅  The other factors, Institutional Framework, Business Legislation, Societal Framework, Finance, 
Management Practices, Attitudes and Values, were obtained from the World Competitiveness Year 
Book  database  (See  Appendix  1  for  detailed  information  about  each  Factor).  This  database 
provides information on 61 localities, of which 53 are countries and 8 are administrative regions. 
Among the countries, 51 have capitalization of stock markets information available in the database 
of World Development Indicator. There are 60 variables of the World Competitiveness Year Book 
database. The scale goes from 0 to 10, and they are grouped in 6 categories: (a) Institutional 
Framework;  (b)  Business  Legislation;  (c)  Social  Framework;  (d)  Finance;  (e)  Management 
Practices; (f) Attitudes and Values. Some categories have sub-groups, as shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1 
 
Categories and Sub-groups of Variables: World Competitiveness Year Book 
 
Category  Sub-Groups 
Institutional Framework  ⋅ Political Efficiency 
Business Legislation 
⋅ Openness 
⋅ Competition and Regulations 
⋅ Labor Regulations 
Societal Framework  ⋅ Societal Framework 
Finance 
⋅ Bank Efficiency 
⋅ Stock Market Efficiency 
⋅ Finance Management 
Management Practices  ⋅ Management Practices 
Attitudes and Values  ⋅ Attitudes and Values 
Note. Source: World Competitiveness Year Book from International Institute for Management Development. (2006). IMD 
world competitiveness yearbook 2006. Retrieved April 2, 2010, from 
http://www.imd.org/research/publications/wcy/Factors_and_criteria.cfm  
After crossing the data, a sample of analyzed countries is presented below: 
 
Table 2 
 
Sample of Countries Analyzed 
 
Countries 
Argentina  Czech Republic  Indonesia  New Zealand  Sweden 
Australia  Denmark  Ireland  Norway  Switzerland 
Austria  Estonia  Israel  Philippines  Thailand 
Belgium  Finland  Italy  Poland  Turkey 
Brazil  France  Japan  Portugal  United Kingdom 
Bulgaria  Germany  Jordan  Romania  United States 
Canada  Greece  South Korea  Russia  Venezuela 
Chile  Hong Kong  Luxembourg  Slovakia  
 
China  Hungary  Malaysia  Slovenia 
 
Colombia  Iceland  Mexico  South Africa 
 
Croatia  India  Netherlands  Spain   
Note. Source: Authors. 
However, analyzing the dependent variable using box-plot, it is possible to notice that there is 
an element that presents outstanding value, which can be considered an Outlier, which was ultimately 
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Figure 3. Distribution of the Dependent Variable and the Outlier (Hong Kong). 
Source: Authors.  
The  average  of  market  capitalization  is  approximately  74  ±100%  of  the  GDP  (taking  into 
consideration the city of Hong Kong), however, with the withdrawal of that city the average falls to 66 
± 60%. The data demonstrates a great variation of this phenomenon. 
 
Table 3 
 
Mean, Deviation & Distribution of Market Capitalization / Gross Domestic Product  
 
Data with Hong Kong  Data without Hong Kong 
Mean  74,0309  Mean  66,0546 
Std. Deviation  101,67668  Std. Deviation  60,77418 
Minimun  0,65  Minimun  0,65 
Maximun  903,56  Maximun  318,74 
Percentiles 
25  20,5985 
Percentiles 
25  20,4445 
50  49,9492  50  46,9763 
75  93,8360  75  93,1523 
Note. Source: Authors.  
 
Factor analysis 
 
Our main concern about previous studies on development of Stock Markets is the supposed 
covariance between the variables that can lead to a multicollinearity problem. In an ideal model of 
multiple regression (using OLS) there is no correlation between the dependent variables; they are 
orthogonal.  Our  solution  is  to  identify  unobservable  factors  that  explain  the  correlations  between 
observable variables. Instead of using all variables, we use factors that represent the covariance matrix 
of a group of variables. Still, it is fundamental to assure that all the factors are efficient and optimized; 
in other words, they must be orthogonal and reduce the number of variables without significant loss of 
data. Thus, we use eigenvalue 1.00 as the criteria for defining the amount of variables of each factors 
and the VARIMAX rotation technique for optimization of loads (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 
2006). According to Fávero, Belfiore, Silva and Chan (2009), it is unusual to apply a factor analysis 
with a sample of 50 observations. The size of a recommended sample for factor analysis should be, 
9
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Switzerland       
South Africa      
Hong Kong, China  
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preferentially, equal or superior to 100 observations. In spite of this recommendation, we have not 
found evidence for rejecting the application of this technique to a database with 50 observations. 
In  short,  Exploratory  Factor  Analysis  techniques  are  used  to  obtain  grouping  of  variables 
(factors), that later on in the analysis process will be used in the multiple regression technique to verify 
the existence of relationship among the dependent variable and the factors obtained (Hair et al., 2006). 
This methodology is also called two-step regression. 
The first step is to find the factor loadings for each variable that represents the correlation 
structure between the variables which constitute each construct. The model is: 
Fjk = fj1.X1k + fj2 X2k + . . . + fjp Xpk     (j=1,...,m; k=1,...n) 
Where: 
X  =  observable  variables;  fj=  factor  coefficient  or  factor  load.  Calculated  by  the  matrix 
covariance between the variables of the factor; j = each firm and k = each factor. 
This way, each sub-grouping of the variable suggested by World Competitiveness Year Book 
(WCYB) was submitted through the factor analysis with two objectives: Reduction of the number of 
variables  and  validation  of  the  factor/constructs  used  by  the  WCYB.  Among  the  sub-groupings 
proposed by the WCYB, only two of them had been separated into more than one factor (Social 
Framework and Management Policy) by the factor analysis procedure. The Table 4 exhibits the results 
of the factor analysis of each sub-grouping variables of WCYB with each factor load (component – 
second column). This produced 12 factors that represent the 60 variables of the WCYB Database. 
After this step, a database was built with 14 constructs (12 constructs from WCYB according to 
Table 4, 1 Construct of democracy and 1 Construct of Social-Human index, HDI, 2010) and the 
dependent variable size of the stock market (Capitalization of the Market divided by Gross Domestic 
Product [MktCapGDP]), comprising a single database that will be used for multiple regression. 
 
Table 4  
 
Constructs Obtained through Factor Analysis of the Data WCYB 
 
Variables  Component  Factor/Construct 
PDG  0.883   
LRF  0.947   
AGP  0.893  Political Efficiency 
GD  0.963   
TRANS  0.932   
BURO  0.940   
BC  0.812   
CA  0.860   
PROTEC  0.930   
PSC  0.933  Openness 
FI  0.857   
AMC  0.937   
TI  0.950   
II  0.736   
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Variables  Component  Factor/Construct 
SUB  0.883   
CL  0.897   
PC  0.832   
PE  0.889  Competition and Regulation 
RI  0.904   
EDB  0.903   
CF  0.834   
LR  0.918   
UL  0.915  Labor Regulation 
IL  0.198   
JUST  0.890   
PSPP  0.938   
RPI  0.933  Societal Framework 1 
SC  0.895   
DISC  0.621   
HARAS  0.923   
Z_FIP  0.692  Societal Framework 2 
GIR  0.893   
CREDIT  0.947   
INV_RISK  0.793   
VC  0.907  Bank Efficiency 
BFS  0.957   
BR  0.944   
SM  0.891   
SR  0.967  Stock Market Efficiency 
FIT  0.944   
CASH_F  0.985  Finance Management 
CD  0.985   
EP  0.129   
CM  0.176   
CB  0.193   
AAP  0.138  Management Practice 1 
SV  0.169   
CS  0.117   
MKT  0.174   
Continue C. A. B. Forti, C. Yen-Tsang, F. M. Peixoto                    364 
BAR, Curitiba, v. 8, n. 4, art. 1, pp. 351-375, Oct./Dec. 2011                               www.anpad.org.br/bar  
Table 4 (continued) 
 
Variables  Component  Factor/Construct 
SOCIALR  0.099   
AOC  0.521   
ENTRE  0.514  Management Practice 2 
HSEG  0.106   
ATG  0.936   
IA  0.805   
NC  0.851   
FA  0.782  Attitude and Values 
NESR  0.891   
VS  0.939   
CV  0.785   
Note. Source: Authors. 
 
 
Results 
 
 
OLS regression 
 
Starting with the new database obtained by the factor analysis, we accomplish the empirical 
testing  using  multiple  regression.  Due  to  the  exploratory  approach  of  this  paper  we  adopted  the 
stepwise backward method for the selection of the variables. Thus, we initialized the regression with 
all available variables and the method drops each variable without statistical significance. Remember 
that the variables mentioned here refer to the factors found during the factor analysis. Appendix 2 
exhibits the first step with all factors regression.  
The method of the stepwise backward multiple regression generated the following result: 
 
Table 5 
 
Result of the Multiple Regression 
 
Coefficients
a 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients
ac  Standardized      95% Confidence 
Interval for B 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B
b  Std. 
Error  Beta  T  Sig.  Lowder 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound  Tolerance  VIF 
(Constant)  .941**  .069    13.712  .000  .803  1.079     
Openess  -.493**  .138  -.747  -3.578  .001  -.770  -.216  .253  3.954 
Stok Market 
Eficiency  .620**  .133  .939  4.662  .000  .352  .888  .271  3.684 
Management 
Practice 2  .319**  .077  .483  4.117  .163  .163  .474  .802  1.248 
Note. Source: Authors. 
a. Dependent Variable: MktCapGDP; b. **Significance of p-value<0.01; c. Number of observations: 50 countries.  Stock Market Development: an Analysis                                 365 
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From the 14 evaluated factors, only 3 were significant at 1% level. An important item that 
deserves mention is the low value (less than 5) found for the VIF (Variance Inflation Factors), which 
means that factors used presented low multicollinearity. ANOVA (Table 6) presents the following 
results: 
 
Table 6  
 
Resultant ANOVA of the Regression  
 
Model  SQ  df  MQ  F  Sig. 
1  Regression  10,538  3  3,513  14,927  0,000** 
Residual  10,824  46  0,235     
Total  21,362  49       
Note. Source: Authors. 
(** P-value < 0.01) 
 
From the ANOVA (Table 6), the hypothesis which tests whether all the coefficients are equal to 
zero is rejected, also at the significance of 0.01. 
To finish the validation of the model, it was verified that the normality of the residual through 
the graph qq (Normal distribution test) and its distribution is random and homoscedastic (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Residual Analysis of the Model. 
Source: Authors. 
Once the model is validated, the R² presented is 0.49 and the adjusted one is 0.46 which means 
the model is capable of explaining 46% of the variability of the studied phenomenon. 
 
Table 7 
 
Explaining ‘Power’ of the Model 
 
Model  R  R
2  R
 2 Adjusted  Std. Error of the Estimate 
  0.702  0.493  0.46  0.485 
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The analysis of the proposed model, leads to the acceptance of the following hypotheses: 
1.  Financial  and  Political  Structure  influence  the  size  of  the  stock  market:  The  acceptance  is 
confirmed by the coefficient related to the factor Openness (Customs’ authorities, Protectionism, 
Public  sector  contract,  Freedom  for  foreign  investors,  Accessibility  of  the  Stock  market, 
Investments  Incentive)  with  the  dependent  variable  (Coef.  =  -0.493).  Again  remember  this 
coefficient is significant at p-value less than 0.01.  
In order to understand the negative coefficient for Openness it is important to review, briefly, the 
literature about economic liberalization and protectionism. In terms of classical and neoclassical 
theories  of  trade,  Smith  (1776),  in  his  work  The  Wealth  of  Nations,  covered  the  theory  of 
international trade based on absolute cost advantage. Ricardo (1817) advocated a free market based 
on the concept of comparative advantages between countries. Besides them, the neoclassical model 
of  international  trade  from  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson,  called  H-O-S  Model,  explained 
international trade based on the abundance or scarcity of production factors that each country has 
(Leamer, 1995). 
Regarding the protectionist approach, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, German philosopher active in the late 
eighteenth  century,  wrote  a  book  that  advocated  economic  protectionism,  called  The  Closed 
Commercial State, in 1800, which deals with customs prohibition, currency inconvertibility and 
the need to have an economically self-sufficient territory managed by the State (Fichte, 1980). 
Georg Friedrich List, in his critical approach to the classical school, does not see protectionism as 
an end in itself, but as a means of developing a strong nation able to trade in a world of free trade 
(List, 1983). After List, Raúl Prebisch presented protectionism as a mechanism of development 
directed towards the periphery of the capitalist system (as cited in Bielschowsky, 2000).  
Several  authors  have  noted  the  present  persistence  of  protectionist  policies.  According  to  Hill 
(2010), “in spite of the apparent promise of open capital markets offered by globalization and 
convergence  theory,  protectionism  is  on  the  rise  internationally”  (p.  1).  The  author  cites  the 
example of China, where, although the authorities deny publicly trade protectionism, it is clear that 
the decisions of the Ministry of Commerce continue to impose barriers to foreign investment. 
Similarly, Aaken and Kurtz (2009) found evidence of discrimination against foreign investors in 
international economic law in the post-crisis 2008. On the other hand, Aktas, Bodt and Roll (2006) 
found protectionist motivations in the intervention of European regulatory agencies in the period 
1990-2000. 
Thus, the negative coefficient obtained in this paper confirms the theory enunciated by Fichte 
(1980),  List  (1983)  and  Bielschowsky  (2000),  and  corroborates  findings  of  the  existence  of 
economic protectionism nowadays by Aktas et al. (2006), Aaken and Kurtz (2009) and Hill (2010). 
The result contradicts the classical theories of free trade set out by Smith (1776), Ricardo (1817) 
and Leamer (1995), among others. 
2.  The second coefficient of the regression Stock Market Efficiency (Stock Market, Shareholders’ 
Right,  Financial  Institutions,  Transparency)  presents  a  positive  coefficient  of  0.62,  statistically 
significant at a level less than 0.001. This factor represents the answers proposed by the papers 
mentioned in the theoretical reference of this study, in a condensed form (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; 
La Porta et al., 2000; Wong, 2009). 
3.  Management practices positively impact the size of the stock market: The acceptance for this is 
confirmed by the coefficient related to the factor Management Practice 2 (Adaptabiliy of Firms, 
Entrepreneurship, Health, safety and environment concerns) with the dependent variable (coef. = 
0.319). The signal of the coefficient demonstrates the positive impact caused by this factor on the 
dependent variable. This hypothesis represents variables that had not been considered as relevant in 
previous studies. Recent studies are inconclusive about the relationship between best management 
practices  and  development.  Bloom  and  Reenen (2010)  showed  a positive  relationship  between 
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would be that a more competitive environment results in best practices to ensure the survival of 
firms.  Another  channel  would  be  evidence  that  improvements  in  management  practices  and 
efficiency have an impact on the capital market where managers are more fearful of losing their 
jobs.  Bloom  and  Reenen  (2010)  also  found  that  public  companies  have  better  management 
practices. Our literature review did not uncover any specific relationship between management 
practices and stock market development. 
 
Analysis of the result  
 
In this paper, we aimed to search for factors/constructs that are capable of explaining the size of 
the stock market of countries in relation to their GDP. The use of factors was considered due to the 
small number of countries (about 50) in relation to the initial number of available variables (about 70) 
and the number of variables used by other authors in studies cited in the literature review. The purpose 
of factor analysis is to reduce the number of variables and to avoid variables with multicollinearity. 
The data treatment enacted found three factors that explain 46% of the variability of the dependent 
variable. These factors represent at least two different constructs capable of explaining the reason for 
the stock market size for the analyzed countries. We can affirm that these factors are different from 
each other by the low correlation coefficient (low VIF). The cross section multiple regression with the 
factors has demonstrated significant coefficients at a level of significance of 0.01, which allows us to 
conclude that they are distinct and relevant factors. 
Concerning  the  other  hypotheses  initially  proposed,  the  hypothesis  of  Democracy  was  not 
confirmed once the Factor/Construct related to the democracy of the country was eliminated during 
regression  due  to  presenting  low  significance.  The  others  (1)  Institutional  Framework,  (3)  Social 
Framework, (5) Management Practices, were also not able to be confirmed for the same reason. The 
HDI (2010) showed little significance in explaining stock market size. 
The biggest advantage of the factor analysis, introduced in the present study, in relation to the 
direct use of the multiple regression carried through by the previous works (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; 
La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Pagano et al., 1998; Ritter & Welch, 2002) is that the possibility of diverse 
common  variables  presented  in  this  study  can  be  represented,  in  the  proper  proportion,  by  the 
constructed factors (Table 4 presents the load of each variable at the factor analysis). Finally, it is 
possible  to  assure  better  quality  in  the  multiple  regression  by  using  factors  with  low  correlation 
between them and minimizing the effect of the multicollinearity possibility which could have been 
responsible for the elimination of important variables in previous studies mentioned in the theoretical 
review. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Due to the unequivocal importance stock markets for country development, this paper sought to 
extend upon previous empirical literature as to the determinants of stock market development.  
Previous studies (Brau & Fawcett, 2006; Dyck & Zingales, 2004; La Porta et al., 1998, 2000; 
Pagano et al., 1998; Ritter & Welch, 2002) did not lead to a clear answer, as they rely heavily on only 
a  few  variables:  the  legal  system  and  its  origin,  corporate  ownership  structure,  minority  investor 
protection, disclosure and IPOs volume. By using a different statistical approach factor analysis, the 
present paper was able to reduce a great number of variables into factors with a higher capability of 
explanation and lower multicollinearity. These factors offer at least two different explanations for the 
determination of the stock market size for countries analyzed in a cross sectional manner, in addition 
to previous explanations found in the previously mentioned literature. The most important factors 
represented  are:  (a)  Openness  (openness  of  a  country  and  its  stock  market);  (b)  Stock  Market 
Efficiency (investor protection and financial structure); and (c) Management Practices (adaptability of 
a company to market change, health, safety and environment concerns, and entrepreneurship).  C. A. B. Forti, C. Yen-Tsang, F. M. Peixoto                    368 
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The factors Openness and Stock Market Efficiency are recurrent issues, highly debated in the 
financial and economic literature (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Fichte, 1980; La Porta et al., 2000; Pagano 
et al., 1998, among others). However, the questions related to management practices, entrepreneurship 
and adaptability of the company to market changes had not yet been approached by cited papers as to 
the capability of developing stock markets. Our paper’s contribution comes from this aspect. For 
future research, we suggest analyzing the issue using panel data, but first making the factorial analysis 
for each year and using fixed effects, so problems regarding specific characteristics of each year of 
analysis can be mitigated and a greater representation of variables by a large amount of records could 
be performed. 
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APPENDIX  
 
 
Appendix 1  
 
 
Table 1 
 
Variables Obtained from the World Competitiveness Year Book Database  
 
Institutional Framework 
Political Efficiency    
Policy Direction of the Government (PDG)  Efficiency of Policy Direction of the Government 
Legal and regulatory Framework (LRF)  The legal and regulatory framework encourages the competitiveness of 
enterprises. 
Adaptability of government policy (AGP)  Adaptability of government policy to changes in the economy is high. 
Government decision (GD)  Government decisions are effectively implemented. 
Transparency (TRANS)  Transparency of government policy is satisfactory 
Bureaucracyc (BURO)  Bureaucracy does not hinder business activity. 
Bribing and corruption (BC)  Bribing and corruption do not exist 
Business Legislation 
Openness    
Custom Authorities (CA)  Customs’ authorities do facilitate the efficient transit of goods. 
Protectionism (PROTE)  Protectionism does not impair the conduct of your business. 
Public sector contract (PSC)  Public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders. 
Foreign investor (FI)  Foreign investors are free to acquire control in domestic firms. 
Access to Capital Market (ACM)  Capital markets (foreign and domestic) are easily accessible. 
Investment incentives (II)  Investment incentives are attractive to foreign investors. 
Competition and Regulations       
Subsidies (SUB)  To private and public firms as a percentage of GDP 
Competition legislation (CL)  Competition legislation is efficient in preventing unfair competition. 
Price Control (PC)  The intensity of the price controls. 
Parallel economy (PE)  Parallel (black-market, unrecorded) economy does not impair economic 
development. 
Regulation Intensity (RI)  The intensity of the regulation of competition and the market. 
Ease of doing business (EDB)  Ease of doing business is supported by regulations. 
Creation of firms (CF)  Creation of firms is supported by legislation. 
Labor Regulations    
Labor Regulation (LR)  Labor regulations (hiring/firing practices, minimum wages, etc.) do not 
hinder business activity. 
Unemployment legislation (UL)  Unemployment legislation provides an incentive to look for work. 
Immigration laws (IL)  Immigration laws do not prevent your firm from employing foreign labor. 
Continue 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Societal Framework 
Justice (JUST)  Justice is fairly administered. 
Personal security and private property (PSPP)  Personal security and private property are adequately protected. 
Risk of political instability (RPI)  The risk of political instability is very low. 
Social cohesion (SC)  Social cohesion is a priority for the government. 
Females in parliament (FIP)  Percentage of total seats held by females in Parliament. 
Gender income ratio (GIR)  Ratio of estimated female to male earned income globally. 
Harassment (HARAS)  Individuals are treated with respect and dignity 
Finance 
Bank Efficiency     
Credit (CREDIT)  Credit is easily available for businesses. 
Investment risk (IR)  Investment risk. 
Venture capital (VC)  Venture capital is easily available for businesses. 
Banking and financial service (BFS)  Structure of banking and financial service (higher, better structure). 
Banking regulation (BR)  Finance and banking regulation is sufficiently effective 
Stock Market Efficiency    
Stock Market (SM)  Stock Market Operations (higher, better operation). 
Shareholders’ rights (SR)  Shareholders' rights are sufficiently implemented. 
Finacial institution tranparency (FIT)  Financial institutions' transparency is sufficiently implemented. 
Finance Management      
Cash flow (CASH_F)  Situation of the cash flow of the firms (higher, better). 
Corporate debt (CD)  Corporate debt does not restrain the ability of enterprises to compete. 
Management Practices 
Abilities of the company (AOC)  Adaptability of firms to market changes is high. 
Ethical practice (EP)  Ethical practices are implemented in firms. 
Credibility of manager (CM)  Credibility of managers in society is strong. 
Corporate board (CB)  Corporate boards supervise the management of firms effectively. 
Auditing and account practice (ACP)  Auditing and accounting practices are adequately implemented in business. 
Shareholder value (SV)  Respect for shareholder value. 
Customer satisfaction (CS)  Customer satisfaction is emphasized in firms. 
Entrepreneurship (ENTRE)  Entrepreneurship of managers is widespread in business. 
Marketing (MKT)  Investment in marketing. 
Social responsibility (SOCIAL_R)  Social responsibility of business leaders is high. 
Attitudes and Values 
Health, safety and Environmental concerns 
(HSEC) 
Health, safety & environmental concerns are adequately addressed by 
management. 
Attitude toward globalization (ATG)  Attitudes toward globalization are generally positive in your society. 
Image Abroad (IA)  The image abroad of your country encourages business development. 
National culture (NC)  The national culture is open to foreign ideas. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Attitudes and Values 
Flexibility and adaptability (FA)  Flexibility and adaptability of people are high when faced with new 
challenges. 
Need for economic and social reform (NESR)  The need for economic and social reforms is generally well understood. 
Values of Society (VS)  The value system in your society supports competitiveness. 
Corporate Values (CV)  Corporate values take into account the values of employees. 
Note. Source: World Competitiveness Year Book from International Institute for Management Development. (2006). IMD 
world competitiveness yearbook 2006. Retrieved April 2, 2010, from 
http://www.imd.org/research/publications/wcy/Factors_and_criteria.cfm  
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
 
Table 1  
 
First Step of Stepwise Backward Method – Regression with all Factors 
 
MktCapGDP(%)  (All factors model) 
HDI – Human Development Index  -1.6754    
  (1.8542)    
Political Efficiency  -0.1895    
  (0.2768)    
Openness  -0.5830*** 
  (0.1980)    
Competition and Regulations  0.4550    
  (0.4033)    
Labor Regulations  0.1879    
  (0.1887)    
Societal Framework 1  -0.0825    
  (0.2982)    
Societal Framework 2  -0.0187    
  (0.0847)    
Bank Efficiency  0.0665    
  (0.2602)    
Stock Market Efficiency  0.4781**  
  (0.2194)    
Finance Management  0.2158    
  (0.1811)    
Management Practices 1  -0.2191    
  (0.1811)    
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Table 1 (continued) 
MktCapGDP(%)  (All factors model) 
Management Practices 2  0.2751**  
  (0.1315)    
Attitude and Values  -0.1846    
  (0.1844)    
Democracy Index  0.1539    
  (0.2018)    
_cons  2.4241    
  (1.6598)    
N  50    
r
2-adj  0.57 
Note. Source: Authors. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 